SERIE DE WEBINARS
Construire sa réaction après-crise

1

Spirale négative, Spirale positive
Passer de l'une à l'autre

Construire sa réaction d'après-crise | em**lyon** webinars 4-7 mai 2020
Dr. Vincent Giolito

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"Strategy is the art of creating power"

(Freedman, 2019)

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
LEARNING FROM SAMPLES OF ONE OR FEWER*

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Organizations learn from experience. Sometimes, however, history is not generous with experience. We explore how organizations convert infrequent events into interpretations of history, and how they balance the need to achieve agreement on interpretations with the need to interpret history correctly. We ask what methods are used, what problems are involved, and what improvements might be made. Although the methods we observe are not guaranteed to lead to consistent agreement on interpretations, valid knowledge, improved organizational performance, or organizational survival, they provide possible insights into the possibilities for and problems of learning from fragments of history.
(ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING; LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE; SMALL SAMPLES)

Learning from Samples of One or Fewer

Organizations learn from experience, but learning seems problematic when history offers only meager samples of experience. Historical events are observed, and inferences about historical processes are formed, but the paucity of historical events conspires against effective learning. We consider situations in which organizations seek to learn from history on the basis of very small samples of experience. For example:

Case 1. A military organization has rarely fought in a battle. Yet it wants to learn from its history how to improve its ability to engage in warfare.

Case 2. A business firm has little experience with foreign acquisitions. Yet it wants to learn from its history whether and how to make such investments.

Case 3. An airline rarely has fatal accidents. Yet it wants to learn from its history how to reduce the chances of such disasters.

Case 4. A business firm rarely makes major marketable discoveries. Yet it wants to learn from its history how to increase the chances of such innovations.

Case 5. A power company rarely has nuclear accidents. Yet it wants to learn from its history how to minimize the chances of such catastrophes.

In the next section, we examine how organizations convert meager experience into interpretations of history by experiencing infrequent events richly. In §2, we examine processes for simulating hypothetical histories. In §3, we examine some justifications for these two learning strategies and some of the problems involved.

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—TONY ROBBINS

#1 NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER

- Augmenter le volume de data utile aux ajustements stratégiques —
  le "log d'incidents"
  - ▶ Devenir attentif aux épisodes qui auraient pu tourner à la catastrophe
  - ▶ La nature de l'échec – Ses circonstances – La réaction de l'entreprise.

- Augmenter la capacité à analyser ces incidents:
  la réflexivité
  - ▶ Pourquoi on frôle la catastrophe? Les divers facteurs
  - ▶ Comment on a repéré le problème?
  - ▶ Comment faire mieux, plus vite au prochain incident?

Qu'allez-vous changer?

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